Showdown in Caracas

Showdown in Caracas
Venezuelan President Maduro tries to steal the election his party lost
in December.
By MARY ANASTASIA O'GRADY
Jan. 3, 2016 4:30 p.m. ET

On Tuesday Venezuela's newly elected legislature, the national assembly,
is scheduled to begin a five-year term. It's not likely to be your
run-of-the-mill inauguration. The country will be lucky to avoid
violence brought about by desperate pro-government militias, aided by
the Cuban intelligence apparatus.

Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro reluctantly acknowledged the
opposition's victory over his United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV)
after the Dec. 6 legislative elections. But in the weeks since he has
ramped up his militant rhetoric, pledging "to combat" any effort by his
political opponents to turn back the Bolivarian revolution begun by the
late Hugo Chávez in 1999.

The problem for Mr. Maduro is that the PSUV did not only lose the
election. It was thrashed, with its opponents winning a veto-proof
two-thirds majority. The new congress will have the power to do such
things as release political prisoners, cut off oil shipments to Cuba,
and schedule a national referendum asking for the recall of the president.

This is kryptonite for the corrupt ruling elite in Venezuela and for the
Cuban regime, which still depends heavily on Venezuelan oil largess. Yet
the eyes of the world are on Caracas, and overt, Cuban-style brutality
is not likely to go down well. That's why, rather than putting National
Guard tanks in the streets as the first option, Mr. Maduro is betting he
can use the courts, which he controls, to crush the counterrevolution.

Whether he can get away with it will depend on three things: the
public's response to being denied its electoral victory at the ballot
box, the opposition leadership's finesse, and whether the army (as
distinct from the drug-trafficking National Guard) decides to uphold the
will of the people.

Last week Mr. Maduro announced that a government investigation of the
election had found that fraud carried the day. He promised that the
details of what he characterized as a sinister plot by his opponents
would soon be revealed.

Separately, the Supreme Court agreed to hear challenges—launched by the
PSUV—to victories by the opposition in eight legislative races. If even
one of those is reversed in favor of a government candidate, the
opposition in the national assembly will lose the two-thirds majority it
needs to override Maduro vetoes.

That shouldn't be difficult to achieve, since the government controls
the Supreme Court. In anticipation of an opposition victory, 13 members
of the court resigned their posts in October, ahead of their scheduled
2016 departure. Last month the lame-duck, government-controlled national
assembly named their replacements to the 33-member court.

Yet as of Wednesday morning there was still a problem for Mr.
Maduro—because the eight legislators-elect whose victories are in
dispute are permitted by law to take their seats until the Supreme Court
rules on the challenges to their victories. The court moved to fix that
late Wednesday by nullifying the election results in the state of
Amazonas, where three of the four winners are members of the opposition.

The opposition cried foul and has pledged that all 112 of its elected
representatives will walk into the assembly on Tuesday morning. It has
called for support in the streets that day.

The government has likewise called on its own supporters to ensure that
the court's ruling be enforced. The chavistas are likely to be a much
rougher crowd.

Nevertheless, Mr. Maduro is very unpopular. Venezuelan oil is now worth
less than $30 a barrel, hyperinflation is ravaging the nation, and there
are shortages of everything from shampoo to car parts and milk. The
murder rate in Caracas is among the highest in the world; the victims
are largely the poor.

Mr. Maduro shows steely resolve in public. But he lacks Chávez charisma,
and the army is said to resent him too. Despite their former support of
chavismo, the men in uniform may be more likely to side with "el pueblo"
than with the former bus-drivers' union leader. The families of the army
rank and file, after all, are part of the suffering lower-middle class.

Since the election, Mr. Maduro has instructed the more than 1,600
military personnel in administrative positions in government to quit
their posts and return to the barracks. Whether their commanding
officers requested that they be relieved of their duties or Mr. Maduro
fired them is not known.

But it is rumored that on the night of the election, despite a request
from Mr. Maduro, the minister of defense, himself an army general,
refused to send his men to the streets to help steal the vote. If true,
this suggests that the army is ready to take the side of the struggle
that is more convenient for it.

The opposition leadership will make that decision easier if it makes it
clear that the change it offers is not a return to Venezuela's
legendary, pre-chavismo, crony capitalism.

Write to O'Grady@wsj.com.

Source: Showdown in Caracas - WSJ -
http://www.wsj.com/articles/showdown-in-caracas-1451856629